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Abstract 
Tests of behavioral insights using field experiments have become more common in 
recent years, and have been deployed by UK government and its agencies. Typically 
these field experiments aim to change individual-level behaviors. The current paper 
tests the potential of behavioral insights for changing group-level behavior. This 
paper reports the results of a field experiment carried out with the Department of 
Communities and Local Government. The field experiment tested whether a 
normative message (vs. a neutral or no message) could encourage parish councils to 
register an asset of community value (social action). There was no statistically 
significant effect from this intervention, but the process of designing and 
implementing this field experiment shows the potential for theories of behavior 
change to be used by government departments.  
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A Field Experiment: Testing the Potential of Norms for Achieving Behavior Change 
in English Parishes 
Behavioral Insights Revolution  
In recent years there has been considerable official interest in the use of 
behavioral insights to inform public policy. Policy-makers are starting to take 
advantage of the wealth of behavioral research from across areas of psychology, 
economics, and other social sciences, which has been popularized in recent years (see 
Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Behavioral insights (or nudge) is a term that is increasingly 
used and understood across disciplines as well as by lay-people. Behavioral insights 
typically consist of low-cost strategies that aim to change behavior. The years since 
2010 have seen central government departments and agencies in the UK and 
elsewhere using behavioral insights to complement conventional policy tools (i.e., 
legislation, regulation, incentives) and to enhance policy outcomes (see Dolan et al., 
2012). Examples of behavioral insights interventions that were first tested using 
experimental designs in the field and then rolled out to improve public policy include 
using tax reminders to collect taxes and using SMS texts to collect court fines 
(Halpern, 2015).  
Governments have always sought to influence human behavior and such an 
interest goes back to recruiting for armies and getting citizens to pay their taxes, core 
functions of government. The study of human behavior influenced the emergence of 
central regulation in the nineteenth century, such as the rise of public health 
legislation and regulation, and continued in the twentieth as government became more 
professionalized and responsive to specialist knowledge, such as measures to prevent 
traffic accidents. However, the greater focus on behavior change as a key objective of 
government emerged more strongly in the twenty-first century following on from the 
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academic advances in the social sciences. Central government in the UK has taken a 
great interest in this agenda and it has influenced central government discussion 
documents (e.g. Halpern, Bates, Mulgan, & Aldridge, 2004). But the visibility of 
behavioral sciences increased markedly with the publication of Nudge (Thaler & 
Sunstein, 2008). Most prominent has been the emergence of the Behavioral Insights 
Team (BIT), established in 2010 under the United Kingdom Coalition government, 
which succeeded in gaining public attention and a measure of success, and was spun 
out of government as an independent organization (Halpern, 2015). Key has been the 
use of the randomized controlled trials (or field experiments) as a way to test the 
effectiveness of these behavioral interventions in the field (Haynes, Service, 
Goldacre, & Torgerson, 2012; John, 2013). These have been done on standard 
operating procedures of government and on new policies, which are intended to show 
the potential for a greater roll out. 
Influencing Organization-Level Behavior 
The current research will examine the potential of behavioral insights for 
influencing organization-level behavior among parish councils. This is a particularly 
important research endeavor for several reasons. First, while ample research (both in 
the laboratory and in the field) has examined the effects of behavioral insights on 
individual-level behavior, much less is known about whether and how behavioral 
insights may affect group-level behavior. Indeed, in spite of the diffusion of 
behavioral insights practices and the greater use of scientific knowledge, English local 
and parish councils have experienced fewer of these behavioral insights interventions. 
It seems likely that organization-level behavior may be harder, or at least more 
complex, to influence than individual-level citizen behavior. Indeed, action from the 
organization is dependent on the decision-making structure within the organization. In 
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other words, organization-level action may be subject to the decision of veto players 
in the organization or may suffer from implementation loss through chains of 
command or simple failure of collective action. Nevertheless, organizations are 
headed by individuals who can respond to behavioral cues. There are examples of the 
use of behavioral interventions directed to organizations in the less developed context, 
such as encouraging the standing of women in village councils in India 
(Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2004) or linking aid to performance with local providers in 
India (Olken, Onishi, & Wong, 2014). In the UK, behavioral interventions targeted at 
businesses, such as Growth Vouchers, show how policy-makers can seek to influence 
organizations (Department for Business and Skills and Cabinet Office 2014). 
Second, given that UK governments elected since 2010 have given a particular 
emphasis to the philosophy of localism, which implies a hand-off approach to local 
government (Lowndes & Pratchett, 2012), novel strategies need to be developed and 
tested to help advance knowledge and ensure better implementation of policies among 
local government organizations. Effective behavioral insights interventions might be 
seen as consistent with the localism agenda as such interventions do not use the 
authority of the state to command local authorities but instead indirectly encourage 
behaviors.  
In sum, the current research aims to contribute to the literature by testing the 
effectiveness of a behavioral insights intervention for influencing group-level (rather 
than individual-level) behavior in a relevant applied context (i.e., among parish 
councils).  
Use of Descriptive Norms 
In this experiment, we draw on the behavioral insights concept of social norms 
(see Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004), which has become the tool of choice of today’s 
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behavioral policy-makers. Social norms can be understood as socially shared 
definitions of the way people do behave or should behave (Fehr & Fischbacher, 
2004). Research on normative theory has suggested that two types of social norms 
exist – descriptive and injunctive (Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991; Fehr and 
Fischbacher, 2004). Descriptive norms are those that “characterize the perception of 
what most people do” (Cialdini et al., 1991, p. 203). In contrast, injunctive norms are 
those that “characterize the perception of what most people approve or disapprove 
[of]” (Cialdini et al., 1991; p. 203). For example, the statement “nine out of ten people 
pay their tax on time” would be a descriptive norm. In contrast, the statement “nine 
out of ten people think that people should pay their tax on time” would be an 
injunctive norm.  
People are heavily influenced both by what other people do and by what other 
people think they should do. Social norms offer a standard from which people do not 
want to deviate as they do not want to risk social exclusion from their group (Schultz 
et al., 2007). Therefore, an effective strategy for mobilizing people to act is to 
publicize the desired social norm. This strategy is a very well validated in the 
psychology and economics literatures and has become a popular tool among policy-
makers to encourage compliance (Dolan et al., 2012).  
Empirical evidence suggests that social norms can mobilize people to act. 
Indeed, research has drawn on social norms to change socially important behaviors 
such as alcohol consumption, drug use, disordered eating, gambling, littering, and 
recycling (e.g., Donaldson, Graham, & Hansen, 1994; Larimer & Neighbors, 2003; 
Neighbors, Larimer, & Lewis, 2004; Schultz, 1999; Schultz, Tabanico, & Rendon, 
2008; see also Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2007). For 
example, one experiment tested whether different types of messages could improve 
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the reuse of towels in hotel rooms. A sign that asked guests to reuse towels in order to 
save the environment led to 37% of people doing so. A sign that highlighted that most 
other guests in the hotel reused their towel more than once led to 44% of people 
reusing their towels. A sign that highlighted that most occupants of the same room 
reused their towels more than once led to 49% of people reusing their towels 
(Goldstein, Cialdini, & Griskevicius, 2008). Therefore highlighting a social norm 
significantly increased pro-environmental behavior in a field experiment.  
The Current Research 
The current research focuses on the potential of descriptive norms for 
encouraging parish councils to act. Specifically, in the current research we explore 
whether a descriptive norm message (vs. a neutral message or no message) can 
increase parish councils’ uptake of community rights policies, in particular the 
Community Right to Bid. The community right to bid gives parish councils and 
community groups the power to protect any local building or land by nominating it as 
“an asset of community value”. The advantages of nominating a community asset, if 
the nomination is accepted by the local authority, are that (1) the parish council (or 
community group) will be notified if the asset is ever put up for sale; (2) the parish 
council (or community group) will have the opportunity to buy it if they wish to do 
so; (3) a signal is sent to the owner making them aware that the asset is valued by the 
community; and (4) the nomination could be taken into consideration by planning 
authorities when considering planning applications (see Department for Communities 
and Local Government, 2015). During the development stage of this study, 1002 
community assets (e.g., community halls, pubs) were listed across the UK.   
In the current experiment parish councils were sent either an e-mail depicting 
the descriptive norm, an identical e-mail but without the descriptive norm, or no e-
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mail at all. Parish council’s uptake of community rights (i.e., asset nomination) was 
subsequently monitored. Based on past research (e.g., Schultz et al., 2007), it is 
hypothesized that asset nomination will be higher among those who viewed the 
descriptive norms message than among those who viewed the neutral message or 
among those who received no message at all. Furthermore, it is hypothesized that 
asset nomination will be higher among those who viewed the neutral message than 
among those who received no message at all. This is because, while unlike the 
experimental norm-Condition there is no motivational incentive, the neutral message 
provides parishes with easy, accessible, and necessary information about the 
community right. Indeed, research suggests that while motivational incentive is 
important for behavioral change, so is capability and opportunity (i.e., knowledge and 
resources) (see Michie, van Stralen, & West, 2011).    
Method 
Sample 
The sample consisted of 3,026 parish councils from all regions in England 
except for London (see Online Supplemental Materials for a full breakdown of the 
sample by regions, counties, and local authorities). The sampling strategy involved 
scanning the web for open-access contact details (e-mail addresses) of parish councils 
- typically accessed via Local Authority webpages. The sample was therefore 
restricted by public availability of parish council contact information. The mean 
precept size (i.e., parish income from taxes paid by residents within the parish area) 
for this sample was £27, 599.61 (SE = 924.22). Precept size ranged from £48 to £801, 
462. Twenty-nine per cent of parishes in this sample had a precept of less than £5,000 
(vs. 34 % of parishes across England). Ninety-three per cent of parishes in this sample 
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had a precept of less than £100,000 (like 90 % of parishes across England; 
Department for Communities and Local Government, 2014).  
Design and Stimuli 
Parishes were randomly assigned to Condition in a one factor between 
participants design with three levels (Message: norms, neutral, none).1 The norm and 
neutral messages were distributed via e-mail (using Mailchimp, a web-based e-mail 
marketing application). The e-mails were sent by the Department for Communities 
and Local Government. Messages (including message headers) were kept identical 
across Conditions. Titles within the e-mail varied by Condition (see Table 1 for a 
depiction, see also Online Supplemental Materials).  
Randomization. In order to randomly allocate parish councils to one of the 
three Conditions, block randomization was employed. Block randomization 
(randomizing within subgroups) ensured (1) a relatively equal number of small versus 
large parishes (in terms of precept size) and (2) a relatively equal number of parishes 
with (vs. without) assets already listed across the three Conditions.  
A phenomenon that became apparent while retrieving parish councils’ contact 
details was that parish councils sometimes shared the same clerk (i.e., administrator) 
with other parish councils (25.4% of the parish councils in the dataset shared a clerk 
with at least one other parish council). Therefore, in the current experiment, one 
parish council was randomly selected per clerk. However, while only one parish per 
clerk was randomly assigned to Condition, the behavior of all parishes will be 
analyzed. It is highly likely that the clerk would share the information with all of the 
parish councilors who they work with. This inclusion of the duplicate clerks in the 
analyses increases the sample size and therefore the statistical power.2  
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Table 1 
Message Headers and Titles 
Condition E-mail header E-mail title 
1.No e-mail N/A N/A 
2.Neutral e-mail 
 
Protect a community asset – 
it’s quick and easy 
Protect a community asset – 
it’s quick and easy 
3. Norm e-mail Protect a community asset – 
it’s quick and easy 
Parishes and local groups all 
over the country are 
nominating community assets. 
Over 1000 assets have already 
been listed. 
 
Measures 
Outcomes were measured in two ways: (1) monitoring e-mail activity; and (2) 
monitoring community asset listings.  
Interest in listing an asset. Mailchimp software was used to send out the 
neutral and norm messages. Mailchimp is able to monitor whether parish councils 
clicked on the link for further information given at the end of the e-mail (see Online 
Supplemental Materials). This offers some insight into whether the norm message 
generated greater, lesser, or equal interest in listing a community asset (vs. the neutral 
message). No reminder e-mail was sent. 
Asset listings (behavioral outcome). We monitored whether parish councils 
listed community assets (offering behavioral data). Listings were monitored via 
inspecting local authority webpages. Listings made prior to the intervention (i.e., prior 
to April 2014) will be referred to as Time 1 listings. Listings made between April and 
August 2014 will be referred to as Time 2 listings. Due to the nature of the 
collaboration with DCLG, only data up to August 2014 were available for analyses. 
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Nevertheless, the four-month period seemed a reasonable length of time to allow 
parish councils to nominate assets of community value. 
Covariates. We also collated information about: (1) geographical area of the 
parish council, (2) whether a community asset was already listed in the boundaries of 
the parish council, and (3) precept size of the parish. These three variables will be 
used as covariates in the analyses on the grounds that areas vary considerably across 
England, that prior listing might affect responsiveness, and that the financial capacity 
would affect the capability of responding. 
Results 
For the norm and neutral Conditions, data analyses were restricted to those 
who opened the e-mail, and therefore to only those who were exposed to Condition. 
In the norms condition 437 (43.8%) parish councils opened the e-mail. In the neutral 
condition 433 (43.4%) parish councils opened the e-mail.  
Interest in Listing an Asset 
Statistical analyses of the Mailchimp data were conducted three weeks after 
the e-mails were sent. Binary logistic regression was conducted to examine whether 
Condition (norms message vs. neutral message) predicted whether or not parish 
councils clicked on the link for further information. Region of parish, asset listed, and 
precept size were also entered into the model as predictors.  
Results showed that Condition did not significantly predict whether parishes 
clicked on the link for further information (B = -.22, SE = 0.26, p = .397, ExpB = .80). 
Precept size was the only significant predictor (B = .32, SE = 0.11, p = .002, ExpB = 
1.38). Specifically, the greater the precept size, the more likely parishes were to click 
on the link for further information. 
Asset Listings (Behavioral Outcome)  
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Whether a new asset was listed. An analysis of variance was conducted to 
test the effect of Condition (norm message vs. neutral message vs. no message) on 
whether a new asset was listed (0 = no, 1 = yes). Analyses controlled for region of 
parish and precept size. Results revealed no significant main effect of Condition, F (2, 
2413) = 0.65, p = .522, η2 = .001 (see Table 2). The only significant effect was a main 
effect of precept size, F (1, 2413) = 4.56, p = .033, η2 = .002.  
Number of assets listed. A mixed model analysis of variance was conducted 
to test the effect of Condition on the number of assets listed at Time 1 versus at Time 
2. Analyses controlled for region of parish and precept size. We employed a 2 
(number of assets listed at Time 1 vs. number of assets listed at Time 2) x 3 
(Condition: norm message vs. neutral message vs. no message) design with the first 
factor being a within participants factor and the second factor being a between 
participants factor. Results revealed no significant main effect of assets listed, F (1, 
2413) = 0.06, p = .805, η2 < .001, no significant main effect of Condition, F (2, 2413) 
= 0.92, p = .400, η2 = .001, and no significant two-way interaction, F (2, 2413) = 0.48, 
p = .620, η2 < .001 (see Table 2). The only significant interaction, echoing the results 
above, was a Precept size x asset listed interaction, F (1, 2413) = 9.86, p = .002, η2 
=.004.  
  
NORMS AND BEHAVIOR CHANGE  13 
 
Table 2 
Means and Standard Errors for the Effect of Condition on Assets Listed 
Condition Whether New 
Asset Listed 
Assets 
Listed at 
Time 1 
Assets 
Listed at 
Time 2 
 M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) 
Norms message .04 (.01) .07 (.02) .13 (.03) 
Neutral message .04 (.01) .05 (.02) .09 (.03) 
No message .03 (.01) .07 (.01) .13 (.02) 
Note. “Whether new asset listed” ranged from 0 = no new asset listed to 1 = new asset 
listed, therefore the means can be interpreted as proportions.  “Assets listed at Time 
1” reflected the number of assets listed at Time 1 and ranged from 0 to 9. “Assets 
listed at Time 2” reflected the number of assets listed at Time 2 and ranged from 0 to 
15. 
Discussion 
This field experiment was designed to test the effectiveness of a behavioral 
insights technique (i.e., norms) to encourage parish councils to use the Community 
Right to Bid (i.e., to nominate assets of community value). The results showed that 
there was no significant effect of Condition (norms message vs. neutral message vs. 
no message) on assets listed at a four-month follow-up.  
 Overall the experiment showed how the behavioral sciences can be adapted to 
seek behavior change in the decentralized context with a valid methodology. The 
nudge approach was light-touch and consistent with a hands-off approach to 
implementing policies in the locality. The results highlight the importance of 
experimentally testing the effectiveness of behavioral insights techniques before 
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further roll out. Indeed, the effectiveness of behavioral insights techniques will 
depend on context, audience, methodology, and many other factors. Therefore, it is 
essential for policy makers to work with researchers to conduct controlled field 
experiments prior to investing substantial time and money in such initiatives. 
The non-significance of the findings could have occurred for many reasons. 
First, it is possible that the descriptive norm intervention simply was not effective at 
motivating behavioral change. However, given the substantial amount of prior 
evidence to the contrary (e.g., Donaldson, Graham, & Hansen, 1994; Larimer & 
Neighbors, 2003; Neighbors, Larimer, & Lewis, 2004; Schultz, 1999; Schultz, 
Tabanico, & Rendon, 2008; see also Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, & 
Griskevicius, 2007) this explanation seems unlikely, or at least insufficient. Second, it 
is possible that organization-level behavior is more difficult to influence than 
individual-level behavior due to decision-making structures within the organization or 
implementation loss through chains of command. Third, it is possible that local 
parishes are resistant to encouragements from the centre. Future research should 
explore these possible reasons further using quantitative and/or qualitative research to 
explore parish councilors’ attitudes, motivations, and intentions on this topic.   
This field experiment had some limitations, which is inherent to any 
intervention of this nature. One such issue was the availability of the asset nomination 
data. Specifically, parish councils’ asset nominations needed approval by the local 
council in order to be successfully listed. Given that we were interested in parish 
councils’ behavioral change, we were interested in their nominations. Nevertheless, 
the dependent variable in the analyses reflected successful listings rather than 
nominations. This was due to data availability restrictions. Analyzing the successful 
listings (rather than nominations) means that (1) we cannot be certain that a 
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nomination was not made before the intervention occurred, and (2) we cannot be 
certain that unsuccessful (or delayed) nominations were not made following the 
intervention. Nevertheless, the random assignment to groups helps attenuate these 
issues. The key suggestion for future research in this particular field is to conduct a 
similar field experiment but over a longer period of time. This would ensure more 
accuracy in the asset listing data. It would also be interesting to explore the effects of 
different behavioral insights techniques. Due to the sample size we were only able to 
test one behavioral insights technique, but it is very plausible that other behavioral 
insight techniques could be more effective as compared to the descriptive norm 
technique employed in the current experiment. Finally, it would be interesting to 
explore whether longer-term or repeated exposure to the behavioral insights 
message(s) would be more effective than a one-off exposure. As local parish and 
town councils become more important and better known by central government, it 
may be possible to craft other light-touch interventions that communicate government 
policy in a way that is suitable to the local context and appropriate for local 
democratic choice. 
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Footnotes 
1 E-mails were sent out on Wednesday 9th and Thursday 10th April 2014. Due 
to a procedural error using Mailchimp the neutral messages were sent out 24 hours 
before the norm messages. This was not intended and we appreciate that this means 
allocation of Condition is no longer entirely random but influenced by time.  
However, we think it unlikely that one day’s difference would make a difference to 
the impact of the treatment. 
2 The results do not differ significantly by whether the duplicate clerks were 
included or excluded.  
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